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THE NEW CLAYTON ACT AND THE
CROWN ZELLERBACH CASE
David D. MarIint
A recent comment in this journal1 considered the manner in which
the courts have dealt with the problem of delimiting the market in
cases arising under section 2 of the Sherman Act. That discussion
was concluded with the statement:
Finally, if the principal case is an example of the complexity
of the antitrust cases which will be coming before the courts in
the future, the establishment of an administrative agency to en-
force these laws might well provide a better means of enforce-
ment than the courts. Such a board would be better equipped to
gather and analyze economic data, would eventually develop eco-
nomic and legal experts familiar with the problems arising out of
antitrust prosecutions, and what is more important, would de-
velop a uniform policy in the enforcement of the antitrust laws. 2
This same problem of defining a market in order to judge the effect
of its structure of control on the degree of competition and monopoly
has been before the courts and the Federal Trade Commission since
1914 in the administration of section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Crown
Zellerbach case is the first case arising under the amended section 7
of the Clayton Act3 in which the Commission has rendered its final
opinion and order.- It is also a case which demonstrates clearly some
of the problems of gathering and analyzing economic data for the
purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws within the framework of an
administrative agency. It is the purpose of this article to examine the
Federal Trade Commission's handling, in this case, of the problem of
deciding whether a particular merger may reasonably be expected
substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly in
a market in violation of the law.5
THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE
The original section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibited one corporation
from acquiring any part of the stock of another corporation "where
t Assistant Professor of Economics, Washington University.
1. 1957 Wash. U.L.Q. 74.
2. Id. at 80-81.
3. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 USC § 18 (1952), amending 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
4. Crown Zellerbach Corp., Docket No. 6180, FTC (December 26, 1957).
5. The author's forthcoming monograph on Section 7 of the Clayton Act
examines the background of the original statute and its amendment and the his-
tory of its administration since 1914.
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the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen compe-
tition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the
corporation making the acquisition or to restrain such commerce in
any section or community or tend to create a monopoly of any line
of commerce." 6 In 1950 Congress enacted the Celler-Kefauver Act,
which amended section 7 of the Clayton Act to prohibit certain acqui-
sitions of assets-as well as stock-by corporations subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission. The amendment also
changed the wording of the standard of illegality contained in the
original statute. The statute as amended prohibits an acquisition
"where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly."7
The amendment thus changed the wording of the standard of il-
legality by removing the phrase "to restrain such commerce." Also,
the criterion of substantial lessening of competition between the
corporations involved in an acquisition was changed to substantial
lessening of competition "in any line of commerce in any section of
the country." Thus, under the new statute the acquisition by an in-
dustrial corporation of either stock or assets of another is unlawful
if there is a reasonable probalbility that it will have the effect of either
substantially lessening competition in any market or tending to create
a monopoly in any market. Some solution to the problem of delimiting
the market is thus necessary in the enforcement of the statute. In
this respect the new statute differs significantly from the old law as
it was interpreted prior to 1950.
In several early cases the Federal Trade Commission interpreted
the original section 7 to mean that the acquisition by one corporation
of a controlling stock interest in another was illegal only if, prior to
the acquisition, the two corporations had been in substantial com-
petition with each other. The Commission usually concluded that sub-
stantial competition had existed between firms if they had been sell-
ing the same types of products in the same geographical areas. The
Commission's interpretation of the standard of illegality was re-
viewed by the Supreme Court in 1930 in the International Shoe Com-
pany case.8 The Court agreed with the Commission that the law pro-
hibited a stock acquisition only if the two firms previously had been
in substantial competition with each other. The Court, however, said
that substantial competition had not existed between International
Shoe Company and the McElwain Company, whose stock had been
acquired, because the products and trade practices of the two firms
6. Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
7. 64 Stat. 1126 (1950), 15 USC § 18 (1952).
8. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
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were not identical. McElwain's men's dress shoes, for example, were
of lower wearing quality but more fashionable than those of Inter-
national. McElwain sold primarily to wholesalers and large retailers,
while International sold primarily to small retailers. The Court found
that almost none of the sales of the two firms had been to the same
customers. It did not consider, however, whether the ultimate con-
sumers of the products of either firm considered the products of the
other as alternatives, to which they might shift if price and product
type changes made them more attractive.
The International Shoe case interpretation of the law implied, and
was subsequently interpreted by the Commission to require, that a
stock acquisition could not be considered illegal unless the two firms
had been selling homogeneous (undifferentiated) products to the same
types of customers in the same geographical areas. Furthermore, if
these conditions were met, the Commission or lower court also had
to find that a substantial part of the sales of each firm were of such
homogeneous products. With the market thus defined, the law would
have been violated only if the Commission could show that an acquisi-
tion had substantially lessened competition in that market "to such a
degree as will injuriously affect the public."
Even if section 7 had applied to asset as well as stock acquisitions,
it seems unlikely that the Commission or the Justice Department could
have successfully dissolved or prevented many corporate mergers be-
cause of the standard of illegality used in the statute and its inter-
pretation by the Supreme Court in 1930.10 If two firms had each
achieved some degree of monopoly power by differentiation of product
or by advantage of location, then substantial competition between
them would not have existed and, therefore, could not be substantially
lessened. If most of the sales of each firm had been sales of one or
more homogeneous products in the same geographical areas, the Sher-
man Act test would have been applied. In such a case if a considerable
part of the total sales of the products had been made by other firms,
then the merger would have been legal even though competition be-
tween the firms would have existed and would have been eliminated.
Under this standard of illegality the law would apply to no vertical
or conglomerate mergers and to only those horizontal mergers that
would be clearly in violation of the Sherman Act.
Not only has the Supreme Court reinterpreted the original law in
9. Id. at 297-99.
10. The meaning of the standard of illegality of the statute was not again
considered by the Supreme Court until 1957 in United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). In this case, instituted in 1949, the govern-
ment alleged that the du Pont acquisition of General Motors stock in the 1917-1919
period violated the Clayton Act as it stood prior to the 1950 amendment.
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the du Pont-General Motors case, 1 but the 1950 amendment has
significantly changed the statute's standard of illegality. It remains
to be seen how the Supreme Court will interpret the amended section
7. In the du Pont-General Motors case the Court recognized the use
of the disjunctive in the language of the original statute and con-
sidered only the question whether the acquisition may have the effect
of tending to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. 12 In de-
fining the line of commerce the Court was willing to make a very
narrow definition, limiting the question to the probable effect of the
acquisition in the market for automobile finishes and fabrics. To the
extent that this case is indicative of the position the Court will take
in interpreting the new section 7, it seems that the Clayton Act has
indeed been significantly changed.
The legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act also indicates
that Congress intended to change the standard of illegality. 3 For
example, the report of the House Judiciary Committee explicitly
stated that the Committee intended the bill to prohibit stock and asset
acquisitions which would not be forbidden by the Sherman Act.14 The
senate committee report stated that the intent of the amendment was
to prohibit acquisitions which may have the effect of either substanti-
ally lessening competition or tending to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, "whether or not that line of commerce is a large part
of the business of any of the corporations involved in the acquisi-
tion."'15 The meaning of the phrase "in any section of the country"
was defined by the senate report as an area of effective competition
comprising an "appreciable segment of the market" which may be a
"segment which is largely segregated from, independent of, or not
affected by the trade in that product in other parts of the country."'
The new section 7 of the Clayton Act not only replaces the old
Clayton Act provisions with respect to intercorporate stockholding,
but it also replaces the Sherman Act as the basic congressional state-
ment of antitrust policy with respect to mergers of all types among
industrial corporations. In judging corporate combinations under the
Sherman Act, emphasis has been placed on the intent of the defen-
dants and on the existence of predatory practices. The Supreme
Court has never considered mergers to be among the restraints of
11. 353 U.S. 586 (1957). See Harbeson, The Clayton Act; Sleeping Giant of
Antitrust? 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 92 (1958).
12. 353 U.S. at 592.
13. This question is considered at some length in the author's monograph. See
note 5 supra.
14. H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
15. S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
16. Id. at 6.
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trade which are illegal per se.17 For a merger to be illegal under the
Sherman Act, therefore, the court either must find a specific intent to
restrain trade or to monopolize, or it must conclude that the result of
the merger is an unreasonable restraint of trade which injures the
public."- If the result of a merger is the achievement of the power to
exclude competitors from the market and enhance the price of the
product, intent would be inferred and the criterion of unreasonable-
ness would be met.19
The new Clayton Act seems to provide a standard of illegality less
stringent than that of the Sherman Act. It appears to be unnecessary
to consider the intent of the merging firms. The new legislative stand-
ard retains a "rule of reason," but it appears that the evidence neces-
sary to show the unreasonableness of the results of a merger is less
than that required by the Sherman Act. One difference in the two
standards might be in the narrowness of the definition of the "line of
commerce" and the "section of the country." The Federal Trade Com-
mission and the Department of Justice, through the district courts,
must implement and give specific content to the general statutory
provisions. The Crown Zellerbach case gives some indication of the
policies which will be followed by the Commission in interpreting the
new law.
THE CROWN ZELLERBACH CASE
In 1954 the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint against
the Crown Zellerbach Corporation alleging that its acquisition in
1953 of substantially all of the common stock of St. Helens Pulp and
Paper Company constituted a violation of section 7 of the Clayton
Act.20 Prior to the acquisition, both corporations were integrated
firms engaged in the production and sale of various types of pulp,
paper, and paper products primarily, but not exclusively, in the west-
ern part of the United States. The complaint charged:
The effect of the aforesaid acquisition by respondent of control
of St. Helens may be substantially to lessen competition or to
tend to create a monopoly in the lines of commerce... in which
17. In some Sherman Act cases there seems to have been some sentiment among
the members of the Court for declaring vertical integration by merger to be
illegal per se, but a majority of the Court has not taken that view. See
United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173-74 (1948), and the
dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 318 (1949).
18. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 466 (1948).
19. United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948).
20. Complaint for the FTC, Crown Zellerbach Corp., Docket No. 6180 (Feb.
15, 1954). In 1955 St. Helens was dissolved and merged into Crown Zellerbach
Corporation.
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respondent and St. Helens were engaged in the Western States,
and more particularly in the Pacific Coast States of the United
States, and in each of them.21
The job of proving such an allegation to the satisfaction of the
Hearing Examiner, and ultimately the Commission, is in the hands of
a group of staff attorneys and economists whose function is essentially
the same as that of the staff of the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department in similar cases brought in a federal district court. In
this case the staff of the Commission attempted to make use of the
special investigatory powers given the Commission in section 6 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. After the complaint had been issued,
the Commission passed a resolution authorizing its Bureau of Eco-
nomics to collect and compile statistical information with which to
ascertain market characteristics.2 2
Under the direction of Dr. Irston R. Barnes such an economic study
was prepared on the basis of questionnaires sent to paper jobbers and
converters and other buyers in the western states. When some of the
results of the study were offered in evidence as an exhibit, the re-
spondent objected on the grounds that the basic material had not been
made available for cross examination. The Hearing Examiner sus-
tained the objection. The Commission then made some of the material
available to respondent but in a way not to identify the reporting
companies. The Hearing Examiner sustained the respondent's view
that the disclosure permitted was not adequate, and counsel in sup-
port of the complaint filed an interlocutory appeal.23
The Commission considered whether the exhibit was admissible as
an exception to the hearsay rule and whether the limitations placed
on the respondent's examination of the questionnaires denied it a fair
trial. The Commission decided that the exhibit was admissible, but it
somewhat relaxed its order with respect to respondent's use of the
basic material. 24 Thus this economic survey eventually became evi-
dence, but the Hearing Examiner stated: "In view of the questionable
probative value of this economic survey, no consideration has been
given it in making this decision." 25 It would appear that an adminis-
trative agency faces much the same problem as a court in cases re-
quiring extensive economic analysis.
The Hearing Examiner decided that the law had been violated be-
cause the acquisition had the effect both of substantially lessening
21. Id. at 6.
22. Crown Zellerbach Corp., Opinion of the FTC, p. 1, Docket No. 6180 (May
16, 1955).
23. Ibid.
24. Id. at 7.
25. Crown Zellerbach Corp., Docket No. 6180, FTC, p. 27 (Dec. 26, 1957).
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competition and tending to create a monopoly in one line of commerce
in the eleven western states. For the relevant line of commerce
he chose the category of coarse papers as defined and used by the
Census Bureau.2 The Commission upheld the decision of the Hearing
Examiner, but gave different reasons justifying the definition of the
relevant line of commerce and the relevant section of the country.27
In economic language this is a problem of defining the market for a
product. Much of the literature on the economic theory of markets
abstracts from these problems by simply assuming the existence of a
market in which a product is bought and sold. The nature of economic
activity in reality, of course, is such that distinct, clearly defined
products subject to transactions among a group of clearly defined
sellers and buyers are seldom found. We do not have many instances
of a particular product produced and offered for sale to a distinct
group of potential buyers each member of which chooses to buy from
among precisely the same group of potential sellers. Instead, transac-
tions take place between a seller of a particular product and a buyer
who might instead have bought a somewhat different product from
any one of several different sellers. Each of these sellers might also
sell his product to other buyers. Each of these buyers might choose
from among several sellers who are not necessarily alternative sources
of supply to the first buyer, either because of a difference in location
or a somewhat different need which he buys to fulfill.
Competition and monopoly in economics are concepts that have to
do with the degree of control over supply in the hands of sellers, i.e.,
the power of sellers to threaten to withhold the supply of a product
unless the buyer will pay a higher price. In a free enterprise economy
this power is inherent in private property rights. The public interest
is protected by the decentralization of such power. A particular sel-
ler's power to enhance the price to a point far above his costs of pro-
duction is limited by the freedom of the buyer to seek alternative
sellers. The antimerger law is designed to limit the freedom of sellers
to centralize control over the supply of a product. Such centralization
reduces the alternatives of the buyer and thus increases the power of
the combined sellers. Even if there were no limitation placed on the
freedom of sellers to combine, the achievement of absolute and com-
plete monopoly in the market for a product would still not be possible
since the buyer would retain the freedom not to buy that product at
all, but another product instead. Thus, the number of sellers of a
product, or the proportion of total sales of a particular product made
by a seller is no indication of monopoly power or lack of competition
26. Id. at 29.
27. Crown Zellerbach Corp., Docket No. 6180, FTC (Dec. 26, 1957).
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unless this information is evaluated in the light of the ease with which
buyers can shift to a slightly different product offered by a different
seller. This requires that the line of commerce and the section of the
country be defined so that the structure of control over the supply of
products, thus defined, offered for sale in that section of the country
provides a meaningful basis for predicting the effect of an acquisition
on the degree of power in the hands of sellers.
In this case, the counsel supporting the complaint argued that each
of several different products should be considered as a line of com-
merce within the meaning of the law. They stated in their brief:
In establishing lines of commerce in this case, counsel in support
of the complaint have considered the products which may reason-
ably be interchanged with those produced by St. Helens.... Al-
though St. Helens produced only sulphate pulp, all papers which
competed with those produced by St. Helens, whether made from
sulphate, sulphite, ground wood or soda pulp, have been ex-
amined....
.... As far as the converting customers of St. Helens were con-
cerned, any one or more of St. Helens' products constituted valid
lines of commerce .... 28
With respect to the relevant section of the country, the counsel sup-
porting the complaint argued that transportation costs isolate the
eleven state western section from the producers in other parts of the
country. They argued further that the "eleven state area can be con-
sidered as containing many 'sections of the country' within which the
acquisiton has substantially effected [sic] competition." 20
The Hearing Examiner chose the Census category of coarse papers
as the relevant line of commerce on the ground that this was the line
of commerce "principally affected by the acquisition." He said:
"Since the greater portion of the production of both respondent and
St. Helens was in the category of Census coarse papers, the area of
effective competition as to products would be within that category."' 0
Similarly, with respect to the relevant section of the country he chose
the eleven western states because it "is in this area that both the
respondent and St. Helens sold the greater volume of papers produced
by them."131
If this reasoning had been allowed to stand as the basis for the
definition of the relevant market in this case, the Commission would
28. Brief, Proposed Order and Proposed Findings of Fact, pp. 19-20, Crown
Zellerbach Corp., Docket No. 6180, FTC.
29. Id. at 26.




have adopted a policy which could cause considerable difficulty in pre-
venting mergers in other cases in which the merging firms were en-
gaged in more diverse operations, even though competition might be
significantly lessened in a particular market. In its appeal to the Com-
mission the respondent challenged both the determination of "Census
coarse paper" as the relevant line of commerce and the determination
of the eleven state area as the relevant section.3 2 The Commission up-
held the Hearing Examiner, but on quite different grounds, saying:
"To the extent that the hearing examiner relied on factors other than
those mentioned in this opinion in determining the relevant line of
commerce, the initial decision does not represent the view of the
Commission."-
In deciding upon "Census coarse paper" as the relevant line of
commerce the Commission explicitly considered the question of the
extent to which other products are effective substitutes. The opinion
said: "Such factors as physical characteristics, markets, prices, and
uses, all or in part tend to distinguish these papers from other papers
and paperboard.'13 4 The respondent wished to include other types of
paper products in the definition, but the Commission concluded that
"the evidence indicates that there is little such substitution in actual
practice." 35
With respect to the section of the country, the respondent wished
to include all of the United States, or at least the region west of the
Mississippi River. The Commission upheld the eleven state region on
the ground that sales made in that area by producers outside were
"relatively insignificant." 0
With the relevant market thus defined, there were only ten pro-
ducers in the market. During the year of the acquisition Crown
Zellerbach produced 51.5 percent and St. Helens 11 percent of the
relevant product. The Commission concluded that the merger gave
the respondent "a predominant share of the market" and removed
"an important, fully integrated competitor."37
This case indicates that the new Clayton Act can be an instrument
for preserving decentralized structures of control of industrial mar-
kets in those sectors of American industry in which concentration
32. Crown Zellerbach Corp., Opinion of the FTC, p. 2, Docket No. 6180 (Dec.
26, 1957).
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id. at 3.
35. Ibid.
36. Id. at 4
37. Id. at 6
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had not already developed prior to 1950. With continued vigorous
enforcement of the statute by both the F.T.C. and the Justice Depart-
ment the current propensity to merge may be radically changed as the
implications of the new law begin to be recognized. The law with
respect to close-knit combinations of previously independent decision-
making units will be brought closer in line with the law with respect
to loose-knit cartel types of agreements.
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